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Awais Aftab's avatar

Illuminating discussion!

"One useful question is whether neurons and circuits carry out identifiable transformations on their inputs while representing something relevant to the world they inhabit. At the level of single neurons, local circuits, neural populations, and large-scale networks, the answer is almost certainly yes."

I am curious. Are there folks in the neuroscience community who would disagree that neurons and circuits carry out identifiable transformations and their functional organization not only correlates with aspects of the external world but has downstream causal relevance? If so, what explains the disagreements? And if not, then what's the whole "representation" theoretical debate really about? It seems to me that once we concede that functional organization captures some property of the external world and is causally relevant, debating whether this is "representation" or not seems rather superflous.

Dawid Wiener's avatar

Michael, lovely piece and unusually honest. “What Might Cognition Be, If Not Computation?” is exactly the kind of question cognitive science has been circling for decades, and it still matters. I really liked that you named the “describable by math ≠ computing” trap yourself; that move saves the argument from the cheap version of this debate. And the fly example is beautiful, one of those rare cases where the levels really seem to close down to the wiring. “The synaptic wiring is the computation” is a great line.

Two thoughts/questions.

First, the definition of computation still feels broad enough that I start wondering about the pancreas: it also transforms inputs into outputs according to rules over variables that matter to the organism. So what exactly disqualifies it? I’m sure you have an answer, but making the cutoff explicit would strengthen the conclusion.

Second, regardinig representation: the fan-shaped body lesion indicates that the signal is necessary for function, but necessity alone may not be sufficient. A power supply is necessary for navigation too, and it doesn’t represent heading. The harder comparison might be van Gelder’s Watt governor rather than the pendulum: a system that causally organizes downstream behavior in a content-sensitive way yet which many would still resist calling representational.

The thing I’d most like to see you chase is that your strongest examples, the ring attractor and the integrator, are not merely input-output mappings. They hold state: the bump persists in darkness, the eye stays put. That sounds like memory/maintenance or more generally, state dynamics, rather than just an input >> output transformation. So maybe the intro framing slightly undersells your own best cases.

Looking forward to Part Two. I’m curious whether predictive processing will come in as support for the thesis or as a competing way of telling the story :)

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